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Abstract
Neural Networks have been shown to be sensitive to
common perturbations such as blur, Gaussian noise, rota-
tions, etc. They are also vulnerable to some artificial ma-
licious corruptions called adversarial examples. The ad-
versarial examples study has recently become very popular
and it sometimes even reduces the term ”adversarial robust-
ness” to the term ”robustness”. Yet, we do not know to what
extent the adversarial robustness is related to the global ro-
bustness. Similarly, we do not know if a robustness to vari-
ous common perturbations such as translations or contrast
losses for instance, could help with adversarial corruptions.
We intend to study the links between the robustnesses of neu-
ral networks to both perturbations. With our experiments,
we provide one of the first benchmark designed to estimate
the robustness of neural networks to common perturbations.
We show that increasing the robustness to carefully selected
common perturbations, can make neural networks more ro-
bust to unseen common perturbations. We also prove that
adversarial robustness and robustness to common pertur-
bations are independent. Our results make us believe that
neural network robustness should be addressed in a broader
sense.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks have been shown to be very ef-
ficient in image processing tasks such as content classifi-
cation [15], face recognition [31] or object detection [24].
Despite their good performances on academic datasets, ar-
tificial neural networks are vulnerable to common perturba-
tions like blur, lightning variations or colorimetry changes
[14, 3]. These perturbations are often encountered in indus-
trial applications and can make some models useless.
Some techniques can be used to increase neural network
robustness to such perturbations. Data augmentation ap-
proaches [28] or fine tuning techniques [36] are broadly
used to protect neural networks. Regularization techniques
in general are useful to build models robust to traditional
perturbations [35]. Despite recent great advances, neural
networks are not successful enough at dealing with cor-
rupted images coming from real world applications [4].
Deep neural networks are also vulnerable to slightly
modified samples called adversarial examples [30]. They
consist in an addition of malicious patterns that can com-
pletely disturb the behavior of a neural network.
A lot of defense strategies have been proposed to make
neural networks more robust to adversarial examples. Dis-
tillation learning can be used to make neural networks more
stable [23]. Introducing adversarial examples in the train-
ing procedure can decrease neural networks sensitivity to
these attacks [22]. Additional modules such as autoencoder
[9], or GAN [26], have been used to protect neural networks
from adversarial corruptions. Regularization is also a stan-
dard procedure to make neural networks more robust to ad-
versarial samples [25]. However, none of these techniques
succeeds in making a neural network perfectly invariant to
adversarial examples.
In some recent studies, the expression ”noise robustness”
or the expression ”adversarial robustness” are reduced to
”robustness” only [2, 20]. However, we do not know to
what extent these fields are linked. Some recent works show
that the salient points used by adversarially trained models
to understand images are close to the ones used by humans
[33]. Then, one could expect these models to be robust to
the same kinds of perturbations as humans. We wonder if
making neural networks more robust to adversarial pertur-
bations could also make them more robust to common per-
turbations and vice versa. To better understand neural net-
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work global robustness, we want to study the hypothetical
correlations between different kinds of robustnesses.
As part of our studies, we provide a thorough method to
build a set of common perturbations in order to estimate the
robustness of neural networks. We carry out experiments
about making neural networks robust to unseen common
perturbations. Finally, we study eventual correlations be-
tween the adversarial robustness and the robustness to com-
mon perturbations.
2. Background and Related Works
2.1. Common perturbations
A few academic datasets are used to compare state of
the art networks: [15, 21, 18]. Academic datasets are re-
ally useful to researchers, but they do not necessarily cover
the various perturbations encountered in real application
cases. In the CelebA dataset for instance, lightning con-
ditions, face positions and colorimetry are constant [21].
But in real application cases, various transformations can
be introduced by sensor characteristics, lighting conditions
or motions. Image processing or data transmission can also
introduce unexpected distortions. We call these distortions
common perturbations. We consider that common pertur-
bations are transformations that are often encountered in in-
dustrial contexts but which are generally absent from aca-
demic datasets. This definition includes traditional addi-
tive noises such as Gaussian or salt-pepper noises. It also
covers global changes in lightning conditions, contrast or
colorimetry. Geometric transformations (translations, rota-
tions...) are also included in this definition.
2.2. Adversarial Examples
Adversarial perturbations are small artificial corruptions
introduced into clean samples so as to fool deep neural net-
works. A lot of attacks can potentially harm most of the
neural networks: [8, 2, 1]. In our study, we choose to con-
sider four of the most broadly used attacks: FGSM, PGD,
LL-FGSM and LL-PGD. They are efficient, and can be eas-
ily computed to test the neural network robustness.
FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) is one of the sim-
plest method used to build adversarial examples [8]:
xadv = x+  ∗ sign(∇xL(x, ltrue)) (1)
With x a sample to transform, ltrue the corresponding
label and L the cost function of the model. We note  the
amount of introduced adversarial perturbation.
PGD (Projected Gradient Descent) is an iterative version
of FGSM [1]:
xk+1 = xk +

n
∗ sign(∇xL(xk, ltrue)) (2)
Starting with x0 = x, the upper expression is computed
n times to craft an adversarial example.
Instead of increasing the value of the loss function, it is
possible to target a class in order to make a neural network
associate the received sample with the targeted class. In
particular, LL-FGSM (Least Likely FGSM) is a variation
of FSGM that targets the class for which the targeted neural
network has given the lowest score [1]. Considering lleast,
the label corresponding to the lowest score given by a neural
network, an adversarial example is crafted by computing the
following formula:
xadv = x−  ∗ sign(∇xL(x, lleast)) (3)
Similarily to LL-FGSM, LL-PGD is a variation of PGD
that intends to make neural networks give a high score to
the label lleast [1]. Starting with x0 = x, the adversarial
example is built by computing several times the following
expression:
xk+1 = xk − 
n
∗ sign(∇xL(xk, lleast)) (4)
When the targeted model is known (we have access to
its architecture and weights), we can directly use it to com-
pute the gradient required for an adversarial attack. In this
case, it is a white-box attack. These attacks are particularly
harmful because they are built specifically to fool a precise
model.
When the targeted model is unknown, the gradient used
for the adversarial example crafting is computed with a dif-
ferent model. This is called a black-box attack. The model
used for the gradient computing has a different architecture
and different weights than the attacked model. Adversarial
examples are transferable among neural networks [30]. It
means that attacks built on a network generally fool other
networks, even if they are very different. Then, black-box
attacks remain harmful on most models. Making a neural
network robust to any black-box attack is a challenging is-
sue.
2.3. Data Augmentation
Data augmentation is a technique used to make a neu-
ral network more robust to a kind of perturbation. It con-
sists in introducing corrupted samples into the training set.
In other words, a neural network that is trained with data
augmentation, learns on clean samples but also on samples
modified with a perturbation. At the end of the training,
the augmented neural network has been made robust to the
perturbation used during the training [28]. When the pertur-
bation used during the training is an adversarial attack, the
data augmentation procedure is called adversarial training
[8].
2.4. Robustness
The definition of robustness is not a consensus. It can
refer to different concepts depending on the context. In this
paper, the notion of robustness is considered in relation with
some perturbations. We explicitly indicate the perturbations
towards which the robustness is considered. For instance
we study the robustness to translations or the robustness to
adversarial examples etc.
We noteAclean, the accuracy of the neural networkN on
a test set. We consider some perturbations φ which are used
to modify the samples of this test set. Aφ is the accuracy
of the model on the test set modified with a φ perturbation.
We measure the robustness of N to a φ perturbation with
the expression:
RφN =
Aφ
Aclean
(5)
We call it a robustness score and it measures the accuracy
loss due to the φ perturbation. The more the robustness
score of a model is close to one, the more it is robust to the
considered perturbation. To measure the robustness score
of a neural network to a set of perturbations S, we use:
RSN =
∑
φ∈S
RφN (6)
2.5. Related Works
Benchmark to estimate the robustness of neural net-
works.
In [11], the ImageNet-C benchmark is used to measure the
robustness of neural networks to common perturbations.
Their benchmark is built on a set of common perturbations
on which neural networks should be tested. Unfortunately,
some kinds of perturbations in the set are over-represented
and some others are not taken into account. In particular,
ImageNet-C contains three kinds of noises and four kinds
of blurs, but occlusions, translations and rotations are not
present in it. Then, we decided to build another benchmark,
more representative of common perturbations encountered
in real application cases. The method used to build it is
given in Section 3.
The robustness to adversarial examples of a neural
network, is usually measured by testing the performances
of this network against several kinds of adversarial attacks
[32, 16, 26].
Links between adversarial robustness and ro-
bustness to common perturbations.
A few works study the links between the adversarial
robustness and some specific noise robustnesses. For
instance, relations between adversarial perturbations and
random noises are established in [7, 13]. These relations
prove that neural networks can be robust to random noises
and remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Links between small geometric transformations and ad-
versarial examples have been established in [34, 6]. It is
argued that the robustness to additive adversarial perturba-
tions and the robustness to rotations and translations are or-
thogonal concepts.
A few links between some common perturbation robust-
nesses and some adversarial attack robustnesses are estab-
lished in these works. However, they compare adversar-
ial robustness with the robustness to a few specific com-
mon perturbations. In this study, we consider robustness to
common perturbations in a broad sense: most of the com-
mon perturbations are included. We want to know if the
global adversarial robustness could help neural networks
to be globally more robust to common perturbations and
conversely. We intend to enlarge the scope of the previous
works to know more about the way the neural network ro-
bustnesses are related to each other.
3. Construction of the Common Perturbation
Benchmark
3.1. Experiment Set-up
We choose the ImageNet dataset to carry out our exper-
iments [15]. ImageNet is widely used, challenging and big
enough for achieving adversarial trainings [27]. Adversarial
training and data augmentation are computationally expen-
sive, they increase the training times of neural networks. To
speed up the trainings, we decided to use a subset of Ima-
geNet. It is composed of 5 super-classes, each regrouping
several ImagetNet classes. The chosen classes are: bird,
dog, insect, primate and fish. They correspond respectively
to the ImageNet class ranges 80-100, 151-268, 300-319,
365-382 and 389-397. The choice of the classes was made
by drawing inspiration from the experiments conducted in
[33]. We insure the size equality of the classes by split-
ting the biggest classes to fit the smallest one. The result-
ing classes each contain ten thousand images. The obtained
dataset is more suitable for achieving dozens of trainings
in a reasonable amount of time, without loosing generality
regarding the robustness study we want to conduct.
We use the ResNet-18 and ResNet-50 neural networks
[10] for our studies. The results shown in the Tables of the
paper have been obtained with ResNet-18. Yet, the same
experiments conducted with ResNet-50 lead us to the same
conclusions than the ones found with ResNet-18. Those
models are trained to classify the images extracted from
our ImageNet sub-dataset. We use a stochastic gradient de-
scent with a learning rate of 0.01. The learning rate is di-
vided by 10 when the training accuracy reaches a plateau.
We use a weight decay of 0.0001 and a batch size of 128.
The loss used is a cross-entropy function. We call the stan-
dard model, a ResNet-18 trained with these hyperparame-
ters without using any data augmentation. It has an accuracy
Aclean of 0.83 on the ImageNet sub-dataset. We also train
a VGG network [29] and use it to get the gradient for the
black-box adversarial attacks. For the trainings and the tests
introducing adversarial examples, the amount of the corrup-
tion () of each example, is randomly chosen. It varies from
0.01 to 0.1 for image pixel values that range from -1 to 1.
3.2. Perturbation Selection Criteria
To conduct the study, we need a method to estimate the
robustness to common perturbations of neural networks. A
natural way to do this is to estimate the network robustness
to diverse kinds of common perturbations. The quality of
the estimation greatly depends on the relevance of the cho-
sen perturbations. We build a set of perturbations based on
three selection criteria: completeness, virulence and non-
overlapping.
Completeness. A complete set of common perturbations
should cover most of the perturbations commonly encoun-
tered in real world applications. To be considered robust to
common perturbations, a neural network should be robust
to as many common perturbations as possible. To build the
most exhaustive list of perturbations, we gather ideas from
several sources. We choose perturbations encountered in
various industrial applications: video surveillance, produc-
tion line, autonomous driving, etc... We also get inspired
by some other works [11, 14]. At this step, we obtain the
following set of perturbations: Gaussian noise, salt-pepper
noise, speckle noise, defocus blur, motion blur, zoom blur,
glass blur, rotations, translations, vertical flips, obstruc-
tions, brightness variations, contrast loss, colorimetry vari-
ations, interference distortions, quantizations and jpeg com-
pression.
The Gaussian noise may appear because of sensors high
temperature or poor illumination during acquisition. Salt-
pepper noise is generally due to errors caused by a conver-
sion from an analog signal to a digital signal. Speckle noise
often corrupts images captured by radars or medical imag-
ing systems. Defocus blur appears because of bad camera
focusing. Motion blur is caused by camera motions or dis-
placement of observed objects. Zooms of cameras can in-
troduce zoom blur. Glass blur is often observed because of
translucent obstacles. The orientation and the position of
observed objects can change depending on the context. For
instance some pieces in a production line can be displaced
or be inside out. We model this with translations, rota-
tions and vertical flip transformations. Brightness, contrast
and colorimetry vary with lightning conditions and sensors
characteristics. Electrical interferences may appear during
image capturing and perturb images. We model these inter-
ferences with small periodic artifacts. Quantization causes
rounding errors that modify images. Some artifacts can ap-
pear because of jpeg compressions.
Virulence. Some perturbations are very virulent and
disturb significantly neural networks. Some other corrup-
tions are harmless: they do not cause a significative drop in
model performances. Then, being robust to harmless per-
turbations is not an interesting attribute. We test the ro-
bustness of the standard model with all the perturbations
selected in the previous paragraph. Most of these perturba-
tions are virulent. For instance, the robustness score mea-
sured for Gaussian noise is 0.81. However, for quantiza-
tions or jpeg compression distortions, the measured robust-
ness scores are above 0.97. We consider both corruptions
not virulent. They are removed from the set of perturba-
tions.
Non-overlapping. The robustnesses to two distinct per-
turbations can be correlated. Making a neural network more
robust to a perturbation can also make it more robust to an-
other perturbation and conversely. In this case, we consider
that these robustnesses overlap. The presence of some over-
lapping perturbation robustnesses can unbalance the sum
computed with the formula (5). If a kind of robustness is
over-represented, it distorts the robustness measure.
We conduct experiments to show that the robustnesses
to traditional noises overlap. We train three identical
Resnet-18, respectively augmented with Gaussian noise,
salt-pepper noise and speckle noise. For each model, its ro-
bustness score towards each noise is computed: results are
presented in the left part of Table 1. Each line of the table
except the standard one refers to an augmented model. Each
column of the table refers to the noise used to compute the
robustness scores of the line. For instance, the model aug-
mented with a speckle noise, tested on samples corrupted
with a salt-pepper noise, has a robustness score of 0.96. Ev-
ery table of the paper is built this way: the lines refer to
various models, the columns refer to the perturbations to
which the robustnesses of the networks are evaluated.
In our noise study, we observe that if a model is robust
to either the Gaussian noise, the salt-pepper noise or the
speckle noise, it is also robust to the others. Then, these
noise robustnesses overlap and so only the Gaussian noise
is kept for the study.
Similarly, we train four identical Resnet-18, respectively
augmented with defocus blur, zoom blur, motion blur and
glass blur. Taking into account the robustness scores re-
ported in the right part of Table 1, it appears that different
kinds of blur robustnesses also overlap. Therefore, only the
defocus blur is considered in further studies. We simply call
it blur.
Blur and noise perturbations are the only perturbations
of our list for which a robustness overlapping is observed.
Selected Perturbations. Relying on those three criteria,
we finally gather the set of common perturbations shown
in Figure 1. From the upper left image of this Figure to
Model
Noise
gaus salt speck
standard 0.81 0.79 0.87
gaussian 0.98 0.98 0.98
salt pepper 0.99 0.99 0.97
speckle 0.97 0.96 0.99
Model
Noise
defo zoom glass motion
standard 0.61 0.80 0.74 0.74
defocus blur 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.94
zoom blur 0.89 0.98 0.93 0.93
glass blur 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.95
motion blur 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.99
Table 1: Left. Robustness scores towards noise perturbations — Right. Robustness scores towards blur perturbations.
Each line title of the table refers to the model used to compute the robustness score. The line ”salt-pepper” for instance,
corresponds to a model for which the training set has been augmented with salt-pepper corrupted images. Each column
name refers to the perturbation used to compute the robustness scores of the column. We observe correlations between
punctual noise robustnesses and correlations between blur robustnesses.
the lower right one, the corresponding perturbations may be
abbreviated with: gaus, art, obstr, blur, contr, bright, color,
trans, rot and flip.
3.3. Perturbation Intensities
Each of the selected perturbations except flip is associ-
ated with a range of intensity. For instance, square masks
used for the occlusion perturbation can vary from 5 to 15
percent of the image size. We define a procedure to fix
the upper and lower bounds of each perturbation intensity
range. In order to fix the lower bound, the procedure starts
with a very small perturbation. The intensity of the per-
turbation is progressively raised. During this increase, the
behavior of the standard model on the corrupted images is
periodically tested. The lower bound of the perturbation
range is reached when the accuracy of the neural network
starts to decrease. We keep increasing the severity until the
perturbation becomes visually disturbing for humans. At
this point, the upper bound is fixed.
To our knowledge, this is the first set of common per-
turbations built on a such thorough method of selection. It
is sufficiently complete to cover most of the widely spread
perturbations. It can be used either in a data augmentation
procedure or to estimate the robustness to common pertur-
bations of a neural network. It is small enough to be used
without increasing the computational cost of trainings and
tests too much. We believe that using this set of perturba-
tions, could help to build neural networks more stable when
deployed in real environments.
4. Common Perturbation Robustness and Ad-
versarial Robustness
4.1. Robust Network Constructions
To study the links between the adversarial robustness and
the robustness to common perturbations, it is necessary to
build neural networks robust to common perturbations on
the one side, and neural networks robust to adversarial ex-
amples on the other side.
A model robust to common perturbations. We first
train a ResNet-18 augmented with all the common pertur-
bations of our set. We call it the fully augmented model.
We test its robustness to each perturbation of the set. The
robustness scores obtained are compared with the ones ob-
tained with the standard ResNet-18: results can be found in
Table 2. As expected, the fully augmented model is much
more robust to any tested perturbation than the standard
one.
Data augmentation is supposed to make neural networks
robust only to the distortions used in the augmentation pro-
cess [5]. Then, there is no guarantee that the fully aug-
mented model is robust to common perturbations on which
it has not been trained. We build a second experiment to
guarantee that the fully augmented network is more robust
to any common perturbations than the standard model. To
achieve this, we train several ResNet-18, each augmented
with all perturbations of our set but one. For instance, the
no-gaussian model is the model augmented with all pertur-
bations but the Gaussian noise. In a general way, the no-φ
model has been submitted to all perturbations of the set but
φ. We compute the robustness of each no-φ model on sam-
ples corrupted with the φ perturbation. We compare every
robustness score found this way with the ones of the stan-
dard model: results are presented in Table 3.
It appears that even if each no-φ model has never seen
the φ perturbation, it is slightly more robust to it than the
standard model. It is true that the robustnesses to two very
different distortions are usually not correlated: robustness
to blur does not help with Gaussian noise. Yet, we observe
that an increase in robustness to a group of common per-
turbations, can imply a better robustness to a very differ-
ent perturbation. The no-gaussian model is more robust to
Gaussian noise than the standard model.
Therefore, with a sufficiently large and diverse set of
Figure 1: Visualization of the selected common perturbations for the benchmark. These perturbations are fundamentally
different by nature and affect distinct characteristics of images. They cannot be reduced to a smaller set without a significant
loss of diversity. Each perturbation except flip is provided with a continuous range of severity.
Model
Noise
gaus art obstr blur contr bright color trans rot flip mean
standard 0.81 0.81 0.95 0.78 0.87 0.94 0.72 0.89 0.94 0.78 0.85
fully augmented 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.97
Table 2: Efficiency of data augmentation on robustness. The robustness scores of the standard and fully augmented models
are computed on the perturbations of the benchmark. Data augmentation makes the fully augmented model much more
robust to common perturbations than the standard model.
common perturbations, it is possible to make a neural net-
work more robust to an unseen common perturbation. As
the fully augmented model is trained on more perturbations
than no-φ models, it has even more chances to be robust
to any common perturbations. Consequently, in further ex-
periments, the fully augmented model is considered glob-
ally more robust to common perturbations than the standard
model.
A model robust to adversarial examples. To build a
ResNet-18 robust to adversarial attacks, we use adversarial
training. We call fgsm, pgd, ll fgsm and ll pgd, the models
respectively augmented with FGSM, PGD, LL-FGSM and
LL-PGD adversarial examples. To estimate their adversar-
ial robustness, we compute their robustness scores on every
attack introduced in section 2.2. These scores are computed
in black-box and white-box settings. Results are provided
in Table 4. Compared to the standard model, the adver-
sarially trained models are more robust to every adversarial
attack we test, in black-box and white-box settings.
Besides, even if each of these models has been trained
only with one kind of adversarial example, all of them are
relatively robust to other kinds of adversarial examples. For
instance the fgsm model is more robust than the standard
model to LL-FGSM, PGD and LL-PGD adversarial exam-
ples. It means that adversarial example robustnesses are
correlated: making a network robust to a specific adversar-
ial attack, helps it to deal with other kinds of adversarial
perturbations.
4.2. Links between Adversarial Robustness and
Common Perturbation Robustness
We can observe correlations between some common per-
turbation robustnesses. Likewise, increasing the robustness
to an adversarial attack makes neural networks less sensi-
tive to other adversarial perturbations. But are there corre-
lations between adversarial robustnesses and robustness to
Model
Noise
gaus art obstr blur contr bright color trans rot flip
standard 0.81 0.81 0.95 0.78 0.87 0.94 0.72 0.89 0.94 0.78
no-φ 0.83 0.84 0.96 0.82 0.94 0.97 0.76 0.92 0.95 0.78
Table 3: Robustness to unseen perturbations. Each score of the second line refers to the robustness of a no-φ model against
the φ perturbation. Various augmentations help the no-φ models to deal with the unseen φ perturbations.
Model
Attack
fgsm fgsm ll pgd pgd ll
standard 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.95
fgsm 0.96 0.97 0.97 99
fgsm ll 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99
pgd 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00
pgd ll 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.99
fully augmented 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.95
Model
Attack
fgsm fgsm ll pgd pgd ll
standard 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.04
fgsm 0.62 0.89 0.27 0.67
fgsm ll 0.42 0.75 0.36 0.79
pgd 0.47 0.86 0.42 0.85
pgd ll 0.41 0.79 0.38 0.82
fully augmented 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.05
Table 4: Left. Robustness to black-box attacks — Right. Robustness to white-box attacks
The columns of the tables refer to the adversarial attacks used to perturb a model, either in a black-box (left) configuration
or in a white-box configuration (right). The adversarially trained models are much more robust to adversarial examples than
the standard and fully augmented models.
common perturbations ?
We measure the robustness of the network augmented
with common perturbations to adversarial examples and
vice-versa. In Table 4, it appears that the fully augmented
model is not more robust than the standard model to ad-
versarial attacks: their robustness scores are almost equal.
So, robustness to common perturbations does not protect
from adversarial attacks. Similarly, as showed in Table 5,
the adversarially trained models are not more robust to the
common perturbations than the standard model. Increasing
the robustness to adversarial examples does not increase the
robustness to common perturbations. Therefore, adversar-
ial robustness and robustness to common perturbations are
independent attributes.
5. Discussions
We showed that relations exist between robustnesses to
common perturbations. It also exists correlations between
adversarial examples robustnesses. However adversarial ro-
bustness and common perturbation robustness are not cor-
related.
This discrepancy could be explained by the significant
difference of nature between adversarial perturbations and
common perturbations. An adversarial perturbation is an at-
tack. It is made to disturb neural networks and it depends on
the sample it corrupts: see formula (1). Adversarial exam-
ples are based on an addition procedure and they are made
with very small perturbations. On the other hand, common
perturbations do not adapt to the neural networks they af-
fect. They are not necessarily additive and can be very se-
vere. Therefore, the way common perturbations and adver-
sarial perturbations affect neural networks might be drasti-
cally different.
Recent works show the difference of nature between two
kinds of features of images called robust and non-robust
features [12]. The none-robust features are the features ex-
ploited by adversarial examples to disturb the neural net-
works they attack. The robust features are the features that
are not modified by adversarial perturbations. In [12], it
is shown that adversarially trained models rely on robust
features while the models not augmented with adversarial
perturbations rely on non-robust features in addition to the
robust features. We think the differences of features used
by these networks could explain the independence between
adversarial robustness and robustness to common perturba-
tions.
Be that as it may, robustness cannot be reduced to the
sole adversarial robustness or the sole robustness to com-
mon perturbations. Those robustnesses are too poorly re-
lated. This independence is restrictive for industrial appli-
cations. Both robustnesses have to be addressed and ad-
dressed independently. It means that it would be necessary
to introduce more regularization techniques or diversify the
samples used in the augmentation procedures. This solution
Model
Noise
gaus art obstr blur contr bright color transl rot flip mean
standard 0.81 0.81 0.95 0.78 0.87 0.94 0.72 0.89 0.94 0.78 0.85
fgsm 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.91 0.78 0.87 0.69 0.82 0.91 0.78 0.85
fgsm ll 0.96 0.87 0.95 0.91 0.73 0.88 0.67 0.83 0.92 0.78 0.85
pgd 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.75 0.87 0.69 0.81 0.91 0.79 0.85
pgd ll 0.94 0.85 0.95 0.93 0.75 0.86 0.61 0.83 0.92 0.79 0.84
Table 5: Robustnesses of adversarially trained models to common perturbations. The adversarially trained models are not
more robust to common perturbations than the standard model.
is time-consuming and computationally expensive.
From a theoretical point of view, we expect robust neural
networks to extract relevant features. These features should
be stable and should not change with common perturbations
or adversarial attacks. Then, methods to make neural net-
works more robust should not depend on the nature of the
corruption. They should naturally cover most common per-
turbations and adversarial attacks at the same time. Then,
we believe that neural network robustness should be ad-
dressed in a broader sense: covering adversarial examples,
common perturbations or even unexpected kinds of distor-
tions simultaneously.
A possible approach to address robustness in a broad
sense is to use alternative adversarial example definitions.
Some new formulations have been proposed to enlarge the
scope of adversarial perturbations [6], [19]. These defini-
tions include small rotations, translations or lightning vari-
ations into the adversarial attack scope. Using more general
adversarial examples in trainings could be a way to erase
the discrepancy between the adversarial robustness and the
robustness to common perturbations. If we can find a wide
enough definition of adversarial attacks, both robustnesses
could be addressed simultaneously.
Generative Adversarial Networks have been used to in-
crease the adversarial robustness of some neural networks
[17]. A generator is used to submit disturbing samples to
another trained neural network. The generator is supposed
to target the weaknesses of the other model. It automatically
finds relevant attacks that help the other neural network to
increase its robustness. The advantage of GAN is that the
allowed range of perturbations is almost unlimited. Pertur-
bations introduced by the generator are not made by hand:
they are not restricted to a few common perturbations or to
some adversarial attacks. Generated attacks can contain a
complex mix of common perturbations and adversarial pat-
terns. GAN should be a good solution to introduce auto-
matically a lot of kinds of perturbations in order to address
robustness in a broader sense.
6. Conclusion
We carried out original experiments to better understand
the links between the neural network robustnesses to differ-
ent kinds of perturbations. We propose a new benchmark to
estimate robustness to common perturbations. We showed
that using data augmentation with a carefully chosen set
of common perturbations, can increase the robustness of
a model to an unknown common perturbation. We also
demonstrated that adversarial robustness and robustness to
common perturbations are independent attributes. We be-
lieve that the key to address neural network robustness in a
broad sense, is to enlarge the scope of the perturbations used
in trainings and tests, by considering corruptions that are in
between common perturbations and adversarial attacks.
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